WASHINGTON — Because they are all-or-nothing contests, American elections lend themselves to over-interpretation.

In 1988, Republican Vice President George HW Bush defeated Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, winning more than 400 electoral votes—a mark that seemed routine at the time, but which no presidential candidate of either party has reached since.

The election marked the third consecutive lopsided victory for Republicans. Analysts declared the GOP had a lock on the Electoral College.

Bill Clinton picked the lock four years later.

In 2004, Bush’s son, President George W. Bush, won re-election. His electoral victory was much smaller than his father’s, but the coalition he assembled appeared robust. His supporters, and some nonpartisan analysts, argued that the GOP had achieved a long-term, stable majority.

The presumed majority lasted barely two years. Democrats recaptured the House in the 2006 and 2008 midterm elections, then-Sen. Barack Obama shattered the idea of ​​long-term Republican dominance.

With Obama’s victory, it was the Democrats’ turn to declare that a long-term majority was within their reach, thanks to demographic trends that would make the American electorate less white, more college-educated and more liberal.

The demographic trends continued as forecast, the political implications, not so much.

Time to say goodbye

I have lived that story.

The 1988 campaign was the first of eight I have covered, and I have spent much of the past 36 years writing about American politics as it has become more rigidly polarized, more partisan and more calcified, to borrow a term from political scientists Lynn Vavreck, John Sides and Chris Tausanovitch.

Since September 2015, I have been writing this weekly newsletter/column, with the aim of understanding and analyzing the changing nature of politics in what turned out to be the era of Donald Trump.

This is the last one. After writing on the deadline for more than four decades, it’s time to retire.

A choice with consequences, but…

The ending brings me back to the beginning – the dangers of over-interpretation.

This year’s election brought striking changes to voters:

• The Republican won nearly half, 47%, of voters younger than 45, up from 40% four years ago, the AP poll showed.

• Trump also narrowly won among voters with family incomes of less than $50,000 a year, reversing a longstanding Democratic advantage, the network’s exit poll showed.

Those numbers describe a big shift toward the GOP, enough for some conservative analysts proclaim a changet of American politics and to motivate a a lot of introspection (and some finger-pointing) among Democrats.

Some other facts don’t quite fit into the prevailing narrative:

• For the first time in more than a century, we have had three consecutive elections in which control of the White House changed parties.

• Trump’s final margin in the national popular vote will come in at about 1.6 percentage points, making this the closest election since 2000 and one of the four closest in the last 100 years.

• After spending hundreds of millions of dollars, control of the House ends up almost exactly where it started, a 221-214 split. Republicans currently has 219 seatsand with two districts in California and one in Iowa is still undecided, they are hoping for 221 again, but may have to settle for 220.

• About three out of four voters voted final NBC News pre-election poll that they follow the policy closely. Harris won the engaged voters by five points, the poll showed. Trump won by 14 points among the one in four voters who said they mostly don’t care much about politics — a group that, not coincidentally, is younger and less white than the more engaged group.

The first of these findings underscores the volatility of this political era. The next two should inspire caution in explaining sweeping change.

The last finding highlights Trump’s ability to inspire a large turnout of people who only occasionally vote. It also points out why Democrats have had an advantage in recent low-turnout special elections and could get a boost ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.

What we don’t know

While these changes are clear – at least in general – much is still unknown.

The results of both the 2020 and 2024 elections suggest that the country is becoming less polarized by race, for example, which is almost certainly a good thing. But they also suggest greater polarization along education and religion lines.

How are each of these trends reshaping the American electorate?

Who, exactly, switched 2024 and what drove them?

For example, we know that in 2020 Latino voters were the most likely to switch to Trump politically conservative Latinosmany of whom had voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 after a Trump campaign that explicitly targeted “Mexicans,” but whose values ​​fit in with the Democratic Party.

Trump made further gains among Latino voters in 2024. To what extent did that increase go beyond voters who were already ideologically conservative?

How much of Trump’s gains among Latino and black voters were tied to the economy and the rapid inflation of 2022 and early 2023? How much was driven by cultural or values ​​issues, which Republicans tried to highlight by campaigning against transgender people?

The Covid-19 pandemic appears to have changed American attitudes toward government, science, and expert opinion, with disturbing consequences for both parties. How far have these shifts gone and will they last?

How do voters perceive the two parties? Now what do they think the Democrats and Republicans stand for?

And beyond the obvious policy preferences like keeping inflation low, what do voters actually want politicians to deliver?

The success scenario for Trump

Many voters have strong partisan or ideological commitments and will stick with their party through all sorts of ups and downs. However, the swing voters who decide close elections have only loose party political connections. They reward (or punish) parties for performance.

In their eyes, President Biden delivered higher prices and chaos at the border.

As I wrote the week after the election, as best we can tell from polls, they voters hired Trump to accomplish two things — keep inflation down and reduce the number of immigrants entering the country.

The best-case scenario for Trump would see steady economic growth, falling interest rates and a reduction in tensions abroad. If that happens, the gains he made in this year’s election may begin to solidify, and talk of a reshuffle of American politics may be warranted.

The failure scenario

A lot can go wrong.

Already Trump’s The nomination of former Rep. Matt Gaetz to be Attorney General has been blown up. The president-elect will still get some benefit from picking Gaetz — the replacement candidate, former Florida Atty. General Pam Bondi, will seem much more reasonable by comparison.

Nonetheless, the Gaetz nomination was an early test of strength, and Trump lost.

There is a risk that the losses will increase. Gaetz’s decision to bail out early means senators will be able to reject another nominee, perhaps former Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, without risking too much wrath from Trump supporters.

In addition to clashes over high-level jobs, Trump faces political risks.

Housing costs rank high among voters’ concerns — especially for younger voters who are less likely to own a home.

Trump promised in the campaign to “drive the rates down so you’ll be able to pay 2% again.”

Instead, interest rates have risen since the election and now sit just under 7% for a 30-year, fixed mortgage. No amount of yelling at Federal Reserve officials will change that. Markets have bid up prices as investors bet Trump’s economic plans will reignite inflation.

Trump’s tax plans risk sharply increasing the federal deficit — adding roughly $9 trillion in red ink in the coming decade, according to an estimate by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, advocates long-term fiscal restraint. At a time when the economy is already operating at or near capacity, it is inflationary.

Republicans in Congress could try to reduce the deficit by cutting costs for Medicaid, health insurance subsidies and food stamps — all programs the GOP has gone after in the past.

During Trump’s first term, however, Republican efforts to cut these programs proved highly unpopular.

That problem may be even worse for the GOP now.

One consequence of winning more low-income votes is that more Republican voters now benefit from federal programs. This is especially true for Medicaid, which, among other things, now pays for more than 6 out of 10 residents in nursing homes nationwide and 4 in 10 children born in most states.

These minefields for Trump can be easily foreseen. Other risks depend on his choice. How the public will react to mass deportation of immigrants, for example, may depend on what Trump means by “mass.”

Still other risks involve events beyond a president’s control.

Here’s one, for example: Many scientists fear that bird flu, which has decimated poultry flocks around the country this year, could evolve to infect humans more easily. If that happens—or if some other, unexpected pathogen emerges—Trump’s campaigns against public health authorities could suddenly look like a very bad idea to voters who currently don’t care much.

In a closely divided country like the United States, even small changes among voters can have big consequences. Demographic changes matter. So do long-term movements of public attitudes and values, such as the three-decade-long trend toward greater acceptance of same-sex marriage.

But so do contingencies and unexpected events—from the skills and personalities of individual candidates to the effects of a worldwide pandemic.

The result is a kaleidoscope of changing patterns that make the political picture endlessly fascinating and far less predictable than expertise would have it.

It has been a privilege to describe that image to you, our readers. Thank you for giving me that opportunity.

What else should you read

This week’s poll: 72% of Americans say America’s democracy used to be a good example for other countries to follow, but is no longer.

LA Times special: NATO’s birthday party meeting in Washington comes at a somber time

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